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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EDWENA M. ARENDS, 
Appellant, 
-vs -
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, AND BOARD OF 
REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 11830 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioner brought this action pursuant to 
Section 35-4-10, U.C.A. 1953, to review respondents' 
decision of August 27, 1969 denying petitioner's claim 
to unemployment compensation. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY 
This is an appeal to review the determination by 
the Industrial Commission of Utah that the petitioner 
failed without good cause to accept a referral to 
suitable, available work and that petitioner be dis-
qualified for two weeks benefits for that refusal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioner seeks an order reversing the Board of 
Review's decisions and an award of benefits for June 1, 
through June 14, 1969 in accordance with the provisions 
of Chapter 4 of Title 35, U.C.A. 1953. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner lived at 121 First Avenue and was 
employed full time as a secretary and receptionist 
for Pacific Flight Support at 940 West 1st South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, beginning June 24, 1968 (R. 14, 16). 
There was public bus transportation to this location 
and she was also able to walk. Because of a reduction 
in force by her employer her position was terminated 
on February 4, 1969 and she filed a claim with the 
Deparbnent of Employment Security (DES) on February 19, 
1969 (R. 14). On March 28, 1969, petitioner was hired 
by the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad at the Roper 
Yards, 21st South and 6th West in Salt Lake City 
(R. 14-15). Since there were no buses or other public 
transportation to that location, petitioner had to 
drive her own car to this employment (R. 15). She 
occasionally experienced problems with the car when 
returning home from work (R. 15). It was not a 
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dependable car (R. 12, 15). Plaintiff married while 
working for this employer (R. 15). This employment 
was terminated May 9, 1969, because the employer felt 
the petitioner was "not suitable for the assignment" 
(R. 15). Petitioner again contacted the Department 
of Employment Security (DES) for benefits and employmer 
references. On June 4, 1969, the DES gave petitioner 
a referral for the following day to the Hi-Land Dairy 
at 700 Vine Street in Murray, Utah for a permanent 
position as a secretary at the prevailing wage (R. 15, 
29). Petitioner called the Hi-Land Dairy on June 5, 
1969, before going for the scheduled personal interview 
(R. 26). On the phone, petitioner discussed the job 
and other circumstances for employment with Hi-Land 
including the actual location of the employment 
(R. 26, 24, 16). After determining the location of 
Hi-Land to be in Murray, Utah, at 49th South and 
7th East, petitioner declined the employment (R. 16, 261 
Petitioner then called DES to inform them of her 
decision to seek employment within the city limits 
of Salt Lake City so that she might resort to walking 
or the use of public transportation whenever her car 
gave her problems as it had at Roper Yards (R. 16, 26, 
12). 
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The next day Employment Security Office referred 
petitioner to Terracor at 529 East South Temple in 
Salt Lake City -- less than one mile from petitioner's 
residence at 121 First Avenue (R. 12, 16). Petitioner 
was hired by this employer and has driven and walked 
to this employment (R. 12, 16, 17). 
On the basis of petitioner's refusal to accept 
employment with Hi-Land Dairy at 700 Vine in Murray, 
Utah, the Department of Employment Security on June 23 
denied petitioner six weeks benefits from June 1, 1969 
through July 12, 1969 (R. 28). Upon review, the 
Adjudication Section felt the facts justified a 
reduction in the denial benefits from six to two 
weeks from June 1, 1969 through June 14, 1969 (R. 25, 
21). 
Upon further appeal by petitioner the appeal 
referee noted that the facts of this case including 
the non-dependability of petitioner's car and the 
distance she would have been required to drive if she 
had accepted the Hi-Land Dairy employment were taken 
into consideration when the original six week denial 
of benefits was reduced to only two weeks of dis-
(R. 20, 21). The Appeals Referee, 
did find as his conclusion of law: 
That the claimant failed without good 
cause to accept a referral to suitable 
available work offered her by the Em- ' 
ployment Office. 35-4-5(c) U.C.A. l953 
(R. 21). 
The Board of Review of the Department of Employment 
Security affirmed the decision of the referee on 
27 August 1969 (R. 4). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AND THE 
BOARD OF REVIEW IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
ACT TITLE 35 CHAPTER 4 u.c.A. l953 TO THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Respondent bases the denial of benefits to 
petitioner solely upon a portion of Section 35-4-5(c) 
U.C.A. 1953 which states: 
An individual shall be ineligible for 
benefits • • . If the Commission finds 
that ••• he [petitioner] has failed 
without good cause ••• to accept a 
referral to suitable work when offered 
him by the employment office. (R. 21). 
Such ineligibility shall continue for 
the week in which such failure occurred 
and for not less than one or more than 
the five next following weeks as deter-
mined by the commission according to the 
circumstances in each case. 
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The determination by respondent must be upheld if, 
when the evidence is looked at in the light most 
favorable to the findings, there is evidence of any 
substance whatever which can reasonably be regarded 
as supporting the determination. Conversely, a 
reversal of that determination can be justified if 
there is no substantial evidence to sustain the 
determination and there is proof of facts giving 
rise to the right of compensation so clear and per-
suasive that the refusal to accept it and make an 
award was clearly capricious, arbitrary, and 
unreasonable. Gocke v. Wiesley, 18 Utah 2d 245, 
420 P.2d 44, (1966); Kennecott Copper Corp. Employ. 
v. DES, 13 Utah 2d 262, 372 P.2d 987 (1962); 
Martinez v. Board of Review, DES, 2d 
The record discloses the following: 
(1970: 
l. Petitioner was given a job referral by the 
Placement Office on June 4 with Hi-Land Dairy (Hi-Land 
at 700 Vine Street (4900 South) (R. 15, 20, 29). 
2. Petitioner telephoned Hi-Land Dairy on June 
5, 1969 (the day scheduled for interview by the 
Placement Office) and discussed the job and location 
of Hi-Land with that employer (R. 16, 24, 26). 
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3. Petitioner, after discussing the job with 
Hi-Land on the telephone, informed that employer that 
she would not take that job because it was too far 
from her home (R. 16, 26). 
4. Petitioner telephoned the Placement Office 
on June s, 1969 after contacting Hi-Land Dairy to 
inform them she would not be taking Hi-Land Dairy 
position because it was in Murray, Utah and too far 
from her home (R. 16, 20, 26, 29). 
Respondents maintained petitioner should be 
denied benefits because she failed without good cause 
to accept a referral to suitable, available work. 
Petitioner disagrees with that legal conclusion, based 
on the record as a whole, which adequately shows the 
petitioner did accept the referral to Hi-Land, by 
telephoning to discuss the work and other circumstances 
of employment with Hi-Land. During that conversation 
with Hi-Land petitioner learned the actual location 
of Hi-Land Dairy. Petitioner did not fail to accept 
the referral as alleged by respondent but instead 
based upon her discussion with Hi-Land, she was able 
to make a rational judgment that the employment would 
not be suitable in view of the circumstances. 
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POINT II 
THE RSCORD AND FINDINGS OF FACT I'll' NCYT SUSTAIN 
THE DETERMINATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH 35-4-5(c) 
U.C.A. 1953. 
The purpose of Unemployment Security Act in Utah 
is to establish financial reserves for the benefit of 
persons unemployed through no fault of their CMn. 
The provision of the statute (35-4-5) disqualifying 
employees from employment compensation is to prevent 
workers from obtaining benefits where there is work 
available and suitable which they decline to accept. 
Lexes et al v. Industrial Commission et al., 121 Utah 
551, 243 P.2d 964 (1951); Olof Nelson Construction 
Company v. Industrial Corronission et al, 121 Utah 525, 
243 p. 2d 951 (1951). 
However, 35-4-5(c) does not require an individual 
to accept every available, suitable employment oppor-
tuni ty offered him by the Employment Security Office 
to be eligible for benefits provided by the Act. He 
is disqualified from receiving benefits only if he 
"failed without good cause" to apply for or accept 
available, suitable work. "Good Cause" as a justifi-
cation for refusal was discussed by the Court in 
p. 561 where it was concluded that "good cause" 
-8-
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as used in the act means such "cause" as would justify 
a reasonable person in leaving his work. 
This court states that the Employment Security 
should be liberally construed to best effectuate 
its purposes of meeting the needs of unemployed 
workers. First, it is to enable them to find suitable 
v1ork; second, it is to provide cash benefits during 
pericx:ls of unemployment. To be eligible for these 
benefits a claimant must act in good faith and make 
an active and reasonable effort to secure employment 
and findings by the DES should relate to the reason-
ableness of these efforts. Gocke v. Weisley, 18 Utah 
2d 240, 420 P.2d 44(1966). 
Other jurisdictions require "good cause" in a 
context of unemployment statutes to be based on real, 
not imaginary, substantial not trifling, and reasonable, 
not whimsical circumstances; there must be some com-
pulsion produced by extraneous and necessitous circum-
stances. The standard is one of reasonableness as 
applied to the average person. Burroughs v. Employment 
Agency, 86 Idaho 412, 387 P.2d 473 (1963), 
81 C .J. s. Social Security and Public Welfare § 167 
Pp. 253, 254. Personal factors are to be included 
in determining "good cause" for refusing offered 
emplo)n"Ilent within meaning of statute. Swanson v. 
Minneapolis -Honeywell Regulation Co., 240 Minn. 449, 
61 N.W. 2d 526, 53'.?(1953). 
A study of the cases yields the conclusion that 
the standard of t1good cause" in each case is to be 
based upon the subjective determination by a reasonable 
man in the same circumstances with the vitalizing 
element of ''good cause" being good faith. 
The record shows petitioner refused to accept 
possible employment by Hi-Land Dairy in Murray, Utah 
when she informed that potential employer he was too 
far from her residence to insure she could find 
reliable, adequate transportation. Although she con-
:.,idered moving closer to that employer she felt it 
would be more suitable to obtain emplo)n"Ilent in Salt 
Lake City, where she was registered with the DES, 
since she lived close to the center of the business 
district and would be able to walk or bus to work 
whenever her car failed her. Her assessment of the 
of having an undependable car and living 
in the business center of Salt Lake City with her 
husband led her to decline the offer of employment 
in Murray. She was then free to accept a position 
at least close enough that she could insure promptness 
and reliability in reporting daily for work. That 
is what she did the next day when, upon referral, 
she accepted a position with Terracor in Lake 
,:ity. 
Petitioner's sole reason for refusal of the 
Hi-Land Dairy position was the location of that 
employer and that she had no reliable suitable trans-
portation to that location. 
Other jurisdictions have ruled on the effect of 
lack of transportation on eligibility for unemploy-
ment benefits when an individual refuses to accept 
a position he feels is too far from his residence. 
These cases have generally denied benefits when a 
claimant refuses work which would require him to 
furnish transportation, even if he has none avail-
able. Copeland v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm., 
197 Okla 429, 172 P.2d 420 (1946); Rabinowitz v. 
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 177 Pa. 
Super. 236, 110 A. 2d 792 (1955); Zupanic Unemployment 
Comp. Case, 186 Pa. Super. 252, 142 A 2d 395 (1958); 
Huiet v. Wallace, 108 Ga. App. 208, 132 S.E. 2d 523 
(1963), Moya v. Employment Security Commission, 80 
N. M. 3 9, 4 5 0 P. 2d 92 5 ( 196 9) • 
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However, these cases can all be distinguished 
from the one at bar on their facts and the issues 
presented. Most of these cases base the denial of 
benefits upon the fact that claimant did not reside 
in a corrununity where any suitable available work 
existed and he therefore needed to be able to transport 
himself a distance which would bring him into the 
sphere of the general labor market so that he could 
become part of the general work force "available for 
work". Once he was able to transport himself to an 
area where he became "available for work" he was 
eligible for compensation. Salt Lake City is not such 
a community lacking secretarial and receptionist 
employment opportunity. Contrariwise, the majority 
of positions for which petitioner is qualified are 
in the central business district within a mile of 
petitioner's residence. She was not detached from 
the general labor market when living at 121 First 
Avenue and there was no need for her to go into 
another corrununity to seek suitable, available work. 
She lived in the area of greatest concentration of 
secretarial jobs in the State of Utah. 
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The other cases deny benefits when the lack of 
transportation claim by an employee evidences lack 
of sincerity or good faith in the refusal of suitable 
available employment. Petitioner has not demonstrated 
any bad faith or malingering. She was not looking for 
a compensated vacation. Instead she was acting as a 
reasonable person to insure she would always be present 
for work and on time for any job she accepted. She 
\vas willing to accept any position in which she could 
serve her employer reliably. Her decision to refuse 
employment with Hi-Land was based on a reasonable 
assessment of the circumstances and the alternatives. 
The reasonableness of her decision is evident from the 
fact she was employed the next day on a referral from 
the DES to a position in Salt Lake City. 
The DES recognizes distance to work and trans-
portation are factors to be considered by an employee 
when appraising a job opportunity. Although the 
Section review stated only that the 
facts of the case justified a reduction in the denial 
of benefits from six weeks to two weeks, the Appeals 
Referee corrunented that this reduction was due to a 




had to travel. "Good cause" must always ultimately 
be based upon the subjective factors and circum-
stances surrounding a claimant and, admittedly, it 
is not always easy for respondent to determine. 
But the respondent must have compelling and reasonable 
evidence to deny benefits to any claimant who has 
demonstrated a reasonable, subjective and good 
faith "good cause" for refusing employment. There 
is no substantial evidence in the record to support 
a determination that petitioner "failed without good 
cause11 to accept offered employment. Conversely, the 
record abundantly expresses elements sufficient and 
necessary to establish ngood cause" as delineated 
by Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
The law requires petitioner to show 11 good cause" 
for refusal of available suitable work. The record 
shows she had "good cause11 for refusal of the Hi-Land 
Dairy position on June 4, 1969 and, therefore, should 
be granted the unemployment compensation benefits 
applied for by her. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Attorney for Petitioner 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841J 
